Louisiana Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1955-1956 Term
February 1957

Community Property - Distribution of Property
Acquired During Existence of a Putative Marriage
Fred R. Godwin

Repository Citation
Fred R. Godwin, Community Property - Distribution of Property Acquired During Existence of a Putative Marriage, 17 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol17/iss2/28

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

NOTES
COMMUNITY PROPERTYDISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
ACQUIRED DURING EXISTENCE OF A PUTATIVE
MARRIAGE

In 1919 deceased obtained a preliminary default in a suit for
divorce, but the default was not confirmed and no divorce was
granted. He and his wife both remarried believing themselves to
be divorced. In 1939, deceased's putative wife purchased immovable property in her name. After deceased's death, and upon
discovering the undissolved marriage, the putative wife instituted a suit against the legal wife and the forced heir to be declared owner of the property. The district court found deceased
to be in bad faith, declared his second marriage an absolute
nullity, and recognized the putative wife as owner of the property. On appeal, held, reversed. After noting that there were
articles in the Civil Code indicating that each of the litigants was
entitled to one-half of the property, the Louisiana Supreme Court
awarded the husband's one-half interest to the forced heir and
the two wives were given one-fourth each on the theory that
their claims were of equal dignity and rank. Prince v. Hopson,
89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), rehearing denied June 29, 1956.
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that property purchased
without a stipulation of paraphernality in the name of either
spouse during the existence of the community of acquets and
gains belongs to the community existing between them.1 Upon
dissolution of the community its net assets are divided in equal
portions between husband and wife. 2 The Code also provides
that a null marriage produces civil effects in favor of the spouses
in good faith and their children." The rules establishing a presumption of community property and those relative to putative
marriage can cause anomalies when operating concurrently. For
instance, where a man, legally married, celebrates a second marriage with a party who is in good faith, the legal community continues to exist concurrently with the community produced by
1. LA. CIWL CODE art. 2402 (1870) ; Salassi v. Salassi, 220 La. 785, 57 So.2d
684 (1952) ; Pearlstine v. Mattes, 223 La. 1032, 67 So.2d 582 (1953). See further
DAGGETT, THE CoMMUNITY PROPERTY SYsTEM OF LOUISIANA 15

and authorities

there cited (1945 ed.).
2. LA. CiviL CoDE art. 2406 (1870).
3. Id. art. 117; Succession of Chavis, 211 La. 313, 29 So.2d 860 (1947) ; Succession of Verrett, 224 La. 461, 70 So.2d 89 (1954).
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the putative marriage. 4 Since the husband is a party to both
marriages, any property acquired in the manners prescribed by
Article 2402 is presumed to fall into both communities. The husband and the two wives are each entitled to one-half of the property so acquired. This problem of dividing a whole into three
5 There
halves was first encountered in Patton v. Philadelphia.
the court denied the husband any interest because of his bad
faith. The property was divided equally between the two wives.
The court has followed the Patton case by consistently holding
that where a man, legally married, contracts a second marriage
in bad faith, property acquired by him during the co-existence of
the two marriages belongs to the two wives so long as the second
wife is in good faith.6
In the instant case the court was confronted for the first time
with a situation where all of the parties were in good faith and
the property was purchased by the putative wife instead of by
the husband. The court held that the property became part of
the community existing between the husband and the putative
wife, and simultaneously became a part of the community existing between the husband and the legal wife. The husband and
the putative wife, both being in good faith, were entitled to the
civil effects flowing from their marriage, that is, each was entitled to one-half of the property7 The legal wife was also en4. Jones v. Squire, 137 La. 883, 69 So. 733 (1915). The community arising
from the null marriage will hereafter be called the putative community.
5. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846). This case was decided according to Spanish law because it was in effect when the husband died. However, a later case held that the
principle behind the Patton decision, although of Spanish origin, was equally
deducible from the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La. Ann.
252, 254 (1852). The Spanish theory was actually one of debt rather than punishment or forfeiture. The idea was that the putative wife's claim was a debt of
the community. Likewise, since the legal marriage had not failed because of the
wife's actions, she too was entitled to her share. The community debts had to be
paid first and when this was done, there was nothing left for the husband. See
Patton v. Philadelphia, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846). Louisiana has developed the
idea as one of punishment or forfeiture. The husband in bad faith forfeits his share
or he is punished for his bad faith by losing his share. See instant case, 89 So.2d
128, 132 (La. 1956).
6. Abston v. Abston, 15 La. Ann. 137 (1860) ; Succession of Navarro, 24 La.
Ann. 298 (1872) ; Jermann v. Tenneas, 39 La. Ann. 1021, 3 So. 229 (1887) ; Id.,
44 La. Ann. 620, 11 So. 80 (1892) ; Succession of Barry, 48 La. Ann. 1143, 20
So. 656 (1896) ; Waterhouse v. Star Land Co., 139 La. 177, 71 So. 358 (1916) ;
Ray v. Knox, 164 La. 193, 113 So. 814 (1927) ; Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310,
62 So.2d 495 (1952). An unfortunate aspect of this jurisprudence is that the innocent heirs of a bigamous husband in bad faith are deprived of any inheritance
while the husband is shielded by his grave from any punishment. For a better discussion of this problem, see Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 162 (1953).
7. This holding appears to place title examiners on notice of the fact that the
interests of the husband and his two wives will vary depending upon whether they
are in good faith.
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titled to one-half the property since the legal community co-existed with the putative community. The court, while observing that
the three claims to a one-half interest could not be fully satisfied, awarded the husband's one-half to his daughter, a forced
heir, citing as authority Article 915 of the Civil Code." Having
only one-half remaining, the court made reference to several
French writers 9 and concluded that since the claims of the two
wives were of equal dignity and rank, the only effective solution
was to divide this remainder equally by giving each wife a onefourth interest in the property.
The respective interests of the legal wife, the husband, and
the putative wife in property purchased by the latter depend
upon whether all the parties actually contribute to the same
"community," or whether the parties are separated into two independent communities and contribute only to the community of
which they are a member. It is submitted that the court in the
instant case fell into error when it took the former position. The
writer proposes that two separate communities existed and that
the legal wife had no interest in property acquired by the putative wife. A concept of two communities is entirely consistent
with the Code articles on community property. A search of the
jurisprudence does not reveal any statement negating this concept of two communities. Moreover, the Patton case, although
speaking relative to Spanish law, states that there are two entire
communities.' 0 Another decision, not cited in the instant case,
held that in a settlement of the legal and putative wives' claims,
the court costs should be apportioned to each wife according to
her share in the property because the suit is for the benefit of
both communities." The opinion stated that "the rule most reasonable to follow is to consider the property acquired during each
12
marriage as belonging to the community of each marriage.'
(Emphasis added.) Thus when H, legally married to WI, contracts a marriage in good faith with W 2, the latter is a stranger
8. The court offers.no reason why it satisfied the husband's interest first and
then compromised the two wives' claims. If the determining factor was that he
had a forced heir, what would the court do in the event that one of the wives
also had a forced heir? Moreover, the heirs claim was no greater than the husband's and it appears that the claims of the three parties were all of equal dignity and rank.
9. 7 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 75, 76, n. 24 (5th ed.
1913) ; 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERiE, TRAITk DE DROIT CIVIL 516-18, nos 1930-32 (3d
ed. 1908). See further Note, 1 LoYoLA L. REV. 54 (1941).
10. 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846).
11. Succession of Barry, 48 La. Ann. 1143, 1148, 20 So. 656, 658 (1896).
12. Ibid.
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to the community of H and W1. W1 is a stranger to the community of H and W 2.
Once the existence of two communities is established, the
question then turns upon the resolution of the issue of which
spouses may contribute to each community, and upon the consideration of the manner in which contributions may be made to a
community. H and W1, being the spouses of the legal marriage,
contribute to the legal community, whereas H and W 2 contribute to the putative community. Since H is a spouse of both marriages, he contributes to both communities. 8 However, if an
acquisition is made by either the legal or putative wife, as was
the situation in the instant case, a contribution is made to only
one of the communities, that is, a purchase by the legal wife goes
into the legal community as she is a stranger to the putative community, and a purchase by the putative wife falls into the putative community as she is a stranger to the legal community.'4
Contrary to this position, however, the court in the instant case
held that the property which the putative wife purchased became
a part of the legal community. This is so only if rights in the
land went through the husband and into the legal community.
Whether this happened can best be determined by considering
the provisions of the Code relative to the manner in which
spouses may contribute to the community of acquets and gains.
Article 2402 shows how property can be contributed to the community:
"This . . . community consists of . . . the estate which they
may acquire during the marriage, either by donations made
jointly to them both or by purchase, or in any other similar
way, even although the purchase be only in the name of one
of the two and not of both, because in that case the period of
time when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not
the person who made the purchase." (Emphasis added.)
The last clause of Article 2402 is controlling since the property
was acquired by purchase. Accordingly, it became a part of the
13. The writer does not offer a solution to this problem, but merely points it
out for purposes of emphasizing the situation at hand. An entirely different problem is encountered when the husband acquires property. For a good discussion of
this problem, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956
Term - Persons, at page 305 supra.
14. Had there been an allegation and any proof of simulation, i.e., an assertion
that the property was bought in the wife's name, but with community funds or
that the property was bought by the husband, but placed in the wife's name, the
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putative community. The husband, as a participant in the putative community, acquired a one-half interest by operation of
law, that is, by operation of community property law. The inquiry is then whether this interest acquired by operation of law
has gone through the husband and become a part of the legal
community. A fair interpretation of Article 2402 is that when
the wife alone makes a purchase, it falls into her community, notwithstanding the absence of the husband's name in the act of
sale, but the article does not create a presumption that the husband purchased the property. It is submitted then that the husband acquired an interest by operation of law - not by purchase. Since the husband acquired nothing by the methods outlined in Article 2402, he apparently brought nothing into the
legal community. Upon his death the only claimants to his share
in the community under this interpretation of Article 2402 are
his forced heir and his putative wife. They are entitled to equal
15
shares of the community.
Although the court in the instant case refers to the "coexistence" of the legal and putative communities, it apparently
does not envision two distinct communities or it would not have
allowed the legal wife to share in an acquisition by the putative
wife, a stranger to the legal community. Following the court's
reasoning, the putative wife would share in an acquisition by the
legal wife. Further, if the legal wife, W1, contracted a second
marriage to Hi, then H and W 2 would share in property acquired
by H, although the latter is a total stranger to H and W 2. Such
results suggest that the court contemplates a multi-party community to which all parties contribute. The writer does not
readily discover any concept of such a composite community in
the articles of the Code dealing with community property. Perhaps the court was led to its conclusion by the fact that in the
prior jurisprudence the legal wife was always given an interest in the property acquired after the putative marriage. However, in all of those prior cases, the property was purchased by
the husband. Under such circumstances, the legal wife would
have a claim even under the writer's analysis because the husband is a party to both communities and both wives have a claim
to his acquisitions. It is submitted that the proper, and more
property would have fallen into both communities. However, this is clearly a case
where the wife alone has made a purchase.
15. LA. CII
CODE arts. 915, 2406 (1870).
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equitable, distribution could have been achieved by considering
the two wives as participants in separate communities and as
strangers to each other instead of forcing them to contribute to
a multi-party community as was done in the instant case.
Fred R. Godwin
FAMILY LAW

-USE

OF BLOOD TESTS IN ACTIONS EN DESAVEU

Plaintiff brought an action to disavow a child born to his
wife during a voluntary separation. Being unable to establish
his non-paternity by any other method, he requested that his
wife and the child be required to submit to physical examinations involving blood grouping tests which could prove that he
could not possibly be the father of the child.' This motion was
denied in the lower court. On appeal, held, affirmed. 2 The
Louisiana Civil Code does not authorize the action en desaveu
based on blood grouping tests. Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1,
87 So.2d 707 (1956).
Article 184 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that "the law
considers the husband of the mother as the father of all children
conceived during the marriage." However, this presumption is
not absolute, and, in certain circumstances, the husband is allowed to disprove his paternity.4 When it is clear that the child
1. For a general discussion of the use of evidence obtained through blood tests
to disprove paternity, see SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 164-289
(3d ed. 1953) ; WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 165 (3d ed. 1940).
2. For convenience of trial, this case was consolidated with another action
brought by the plaintiff against his wife for divorce on the grounds of adultery.
The court refused to grant the husband a divorce, finding that he failed to establish the adultery of the wife.
On the grounds that he did not have the authority to order anyone to submit
to a skin puncture, the trial judge refused to order the tests. Plaintiff contended
on appeal that the virtual incorporation of the Discovery Statute of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the Louisiana Revised Statutes beginning
13:3741 gave the court the authority to order such a test. He cited the case of
Beach v. Beach, 72 App. D.C. 318, 114 F.2d 479 (1940), which held that such
an examination involving blood grouping tests could be ordered under Rule 35(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. Rule 35(a) (1948). The
Supreme Court did not decide whether or not such a test could be ordered under
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3783, but the case was affirmed on the theory
that, even if the evidence was obtained through the tests, a disavowal of a child
conceived during the marriage could not be based on such evidence under the
Louisiana Civil Code.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 184 (1870).
4. For a general discussion of the action en ddaaveu, see Comment, Presumption of Legitimacy and the Action en Ddsaveu, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587
(1953) and 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 401 (1954); Guillory, The Action en
Ddaaveu, 5 TUL. L. REV. 449 (1931).

